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1 Introduction
Assume you work at a University that bases some of your wage on the departments
performance. One day you get accepted in a top ranked journal. The department
chair celebrates (and so do you), but you are a bit worried about this years bonus
because your colleagues havent been too productive lately. What do you do? Well, no-
one is able take your publication away from you, and since a number of Universities
are willing to pay for your achievements, you go back to the department chair, show
her your job o¤ers, and renegotiate the wage.1 The department chair then has a
dilemma. By agreeing to renegotiate the bonus, she obstructs the whole idea of paying
on the basis of group performance.
Next year, your University decides to implement bonuses based on relative per-
formance. Each department is asked to rank their researchersperformance and then
pay bonuses according to this ranking. Again you achieve a nice publication. The
problem this year, however, is that so do also your colleagues. In fact they do even
better than you, and your bonus becomes rather poor. What do you do? Again you
take your publication with you, apply for job elsewhere and come back to renegotiate
the wage. The University evaluates its incentive system and concludes: It has to base
bonuses on individual performance.
Your university collaborates with a high-tech company who shares some of the
same problems. The engineers run away or renegotiate wages once they have devel-
oped a promising concept. The trouble is that both group incentives and tournaments
are crucial for promoting cooperation and competition among the engineers. So in-
stead of changing to individually based incentives, the company chooses the strategy
of asset control. By carefully developing a system of patent protection, and by assur-
ing that their engineers do not get access to a larger share of strategic assets than
necessary, they are able to implement peer-dependent incentives without running the
risk of opportunism and expropriation.
In his paper The rm as a subeconomyHolmström (1999) asks: why do modern
1In some countries, the universities funding partly depends on publications. This makes re-
searchers with publications that are forthcoming especially attractive.
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rms own essentially all of the productive assets that it employs? And he answers:
when a rm owns the critical assets involved in production, it has the ability to
restructure the incentives of those who join the rm (the employees). In particular,
by owning assets the rm can avoid problems of multitasking and rent seeking. (The
ideas from Holmströms 1999-paper are based on Holmström and Milgrom, 1991 and
1994.) We further develop this idea by making the following point: if a rm does
not control its assets, or more generally if its workers are able to hold-up values ex
post production, then incentive contracts based on peer-dependence are costly to
implement. While Holmström and Milgrom show how a rm by giving up control
rights, loses the ability to balance incentives between various tasks, we show how
the rm by giving up control rights loses the ability to exploit the advantages that
lie in designing peer-dependent incentives. An implication from our analysis is that
the rm will control its assets if there exists conditions that make peer-dependent
performance evaluation desirable.2 In particular, we show that if there exists common
noise that makes relative performance evaluation optimal, then the rm will be more
reluctant to allow its employees to possess considerable hold-up power.
Our approach involves assuming that it is costly for the rm to control its employ-
eeshold-up power, where this power is a function of bargaining power and outside
2The literature has pointed on numerous reasons for why it may be e¢ cient to tie an agents
compensation to the performance of the agents peers. By tying compensation to the agents
relative performance, the principal can lter out common noise so that compensation to the largest
possible extent is based on real e¤ort, not random shocks that are outside the agents control (see
Holmström,1982; and Mookherjee, 1984). With RPEs special form, rank-order tournaments, the
agents are also completely insulated from the risk of common negative shocks (see Lazear and Rosen,
1981; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983; Green and Stokey, 1983). Moreover, tournaments need only rely
on ordinal performance measures. It may thus be easier and less costly to measure relative than
absolute performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In addition, it may be easier for the principal to
commit to tournament schemes if output is not veriable, since the number of high bonusesare
smaller than under independent contracts (Carmichael, 1983; Malcomson, 1984; Levin 2002).
There are also obvious arguments for tying compensation to the joint performance of a group
of agents. Joint performance evaluation can promote cooperation since an agent is rewarded if his
peers perform well (see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh 1993; and Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo, 1993). JPE can also provide implicit incentives not to shirk (or exert low e¤ort),
since shirking may have social costs (as in Kandel and Lazear, 1992), or induce other agents to
shirk, which again reduces the shirking agents expected compensation (as in Che and Yoo, 2001).
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options. These costs of constraining the workers hold-up power can follow from
patenting that seeks to protect (intellectual) property rights, or from designing spe-
cic non-competing clauses in the employment contract.3 The rm can also reduce
the workershold-up power through allocation of asset ownership (as in the property
rights approach, starting with Grossman and Hart, 1986), or through access control
(as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The workershold-up power will also depend on
the specicity of the their value-added. The more rm specic human capital the
workers possess - or the more narrow their skill sets are - the lower is the alternative
value of the workersproduction, relative to rm specic value. But even if the al-
ternative value is zero, the workers can still hold-up values if they possess essential
human capital that makes them indispensable for ex post value extraction. The rm
can thus reduce the workershold-up power through job design, such as job rotation
(see e.g. Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2006), making them ex post dispensable.
Assuming, then, that the rm can choose how much hold-up power it will admit
its agents to possess, we investigate the trade-o¤between incentive provision and the
costs of controlling the agentshold-up power. This idea is related to the literature on
human capital and the problems of expropriation (see e.g. Liebskind, 1996; Rebitzer
and Taylor, 2001; and Rajan and Zingales, 2001). The focus in this literature is
on how organizational design and incentive structure can a¤ect the rms ability
to protect strategic assets. While the costs of trying to avoid expropriation is at
the heart of this literature and is thus endogenous, the costs of losing control over
strategic assets is exogenous. We endogenize the costs of losing control by showing
that these costs vary with the gain from being able to implement advantageous
incentive systems, in particular systems involving relative performance evaluation.
In the theory of the rm literature, the boundaries of the rm are often dened by
the total hold-up power of the seller (see e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy, 2002), where the hold-up power typically is zero, or small,
for employees and high for independent suppliers/contractors. We consider a con-
tinuous index of hold-up power instead of a discrete integration vs non-integration
3See Levin and Tadelis (2005) for an interesting discussion of non-compete clauses in partner-
ships.
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variable, and endogenously determine the level of this power index. A higher de-
gree of hold-up power can then be interpreted as a move from more integrated to
less integrated transactions. A corollary from our analysis is then that integrated
transactions exhibit more common noise and peer-dependent incentive systems, while
non-integrated transactions exhibit less noise and independent performance pay. In-
terestingly, we also nd that the marginal cost of higher agent-hold-up increases with
the partiesdiscount factor, , i.e. their valuation of future trade. If we interpret the
discount factor as a measure of the dependency, or trust level, between the transact-
ing parties, we may take  = 0 to represent spot transactions, and  = 1 to represent
fully dependent high-trust relationships. A result from our model is then that spot
transactions are more likely to be organized in markets, while long-term relationships
are more likely to be organized within rms. This appears to be a highly plausible
prediction.
Our results rest on a premise that the quality of the workers output is non-
veriable, and that the incentive contracts therefore are incomplete. As is well
known, the problem of incomplete contracting can be mitigated by repeated in-
teraction. Through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each
other to breach the contract, by letting breach ruin future trade. The parties can
thus commit to engage in so-called self-enforcing relational contracting.4 In Kvaløy
and Olsen (2006a, 2006b), we investigate the scope for implementing team incentives
in relational contracts. The present paper complements and extends Kvaløy and
Olsen (2006b) in two respects. First, we introduce common noise - making relative
performance evaluation optimal. Second, and most importantly, we endogenize the
agentshold-up power, and deduce optimal agent-hold-up from the viewpoint of the
principal.
The papers ll a gap: In the vast literature on multiagent moral hazard(which
deals with optimal provision of incentives to several workers), it is (implicitly) as-
sumed that residual control rights are exclusively in the hands of the rm (inuential
papers include Lazear and Rosen, 1981, and Holmström, 1982). And in the litera-
4There is a growing literature on relational contracting, see in particular recent inuential papers
by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and Levin (2003).
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ture dealing with optimal allocation of control rights, the multiagent moral hazard
problem is not considered (starting with Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Hart and
More, 19905, who analyze static relationships, and more recently Halonen, 2002; and
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, who analyze repeated bilateral relationships).
Our contribution is thus to consider the e¤ect of workers possessing residual control
rights when the rm faces a multiagent moral hazard problem.
2 The Model
Consider an economic environment consisting of one principal and two identical
agents who each period produce either high, QH , or low, QL, values for the principal.
Each agents e¤ort level can be either high or low, where high e¤ort has a disutility
cost of c and low e¤ort is costless. The principal can only observe the realization of
the agentsoutput, not the level of e¤ort they choose. Similarly, agent i can only
observe agent js output, not his e¤ort level.6
The agentsoutputs depend on e¤orts and noise. We follow Che and Yoo (2001),
assuming that a favorable shock occurs with probability  2 (0; 1), in which both
agents produce high values for the principal. If the shock is unfavorable, the prob-
ability for agent i of realizing QH is qH if the agents e¤ort is high and qL if the
agents e¤ort is low, where 1 > qH > qL  0. As one may expect, the common noise
factor makes relative performance evaluation desirable. This aspect complements
and extends the model analyzed in Kvaløy and Olsen (2006b).
It is assumed that all parties are risk neutral, but that the agents are subject
to limited liability: the principal cannot impose negative wages.7 Ex ante outside
options are normalized to zero. The participation constraint then holds trivially by
5Although Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a model with many agents, they do not consider the
classical moral hazard problem that we address, where a principal can only observe a noisy measure
of the agentse¤ort.
6Whether or not the agents can observe each others e¤ort level is not decisive for the analysis
presented. However, by assuming that e¤ort is unobservable among the agents, we do not need to
model repeated peer monitoring.
7Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit rms from
extracting payments from workers.
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the limited liability assumption.
We assume that if the parties engage in an incentive contract, agent i receives a
bonus vector   (iHH ; iHL; iLH ; iLL) where the subscripts refer to respectively
agent i and agent js realization of Qk, (k = H;L):
Let agents i and j choose e¤orts k 2 fH;Lg and l 2 fH;Lg respectively. Agent
is expected wage is then
(k; l;i)  iHH+(1 )

qkql
i
HH + qk(1  ql)iHL + (1  qk)qliLH + (1  qk)(1  ql)iLL

(1)
For each agent, a wage scheme exhibits joint performance evaluation if (HH ; LH)
> (HL; LL)
8. (For the most part, we suppress agent-notation in superscript since
the agents are identical.) In this case (k;H;) > (k; L;), so an agents work
yields positive externalities to his partner. A wage scheme exhibits relative perfor-
mance evaluation if (HH ; LH) < (HL LL). In this case (k;H;) < (k; L;),
so an agents work generates a negative externality for his partner. A wage scheme
exhibits independent performance evaluation if (HH ; LH) = (HL LL), which im-
plies (k;H;) = (k; L;), so an agents work has no impact on his partner.
2.1 Optimal contract when output is veriable
As a benchmark, we rst consider the least cost incentive contract when output is
veriable. For an incentive contract to be viable, the value of high e¤ort must weakly
exceed the cost of e¤ort, that is
(1  )qQ  c (2)
where q = qH   qL and Q = QH  QL. Assuming that (2) holds, the principals
problem is to minimize the wage payments subject to the constraints that the agents
8The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at least one
component.
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must be induced to yield high e¤ort. A contract  induces both agents to work if
(H;H;)  c  (L;H;) (3)
The left hand side (LHS) shows the expected wage from exerting high e¤ort, while
the right hand side (RHS) shows the expected wage from exerting low e¤ort. The
condition ensures that high e¤ort from both agents is an equilibrium, given the
contract . The agentsequilibrium is unique if high e¤ort is a dominant strategy,
i.e. if (H;L; ) c  (L;L; ) holds in addition to (3). We will discuss uniqueness
below.
The principal solves
min
0
(H;H;), subject to (3) (4)
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint (3) can be written
qHHH + (1  qH)HL   qHLH   (1  qH)LL 
c
(1  )q (IC)
Now, by IC and the denition (1) of the wage cost (k; l; ), we have, for  =
(H;H;):
 = HH + (1  ) [qH(qHHH + (1  qH)HL) + (1  qH)(qHLH + (1  qH)LL)](5)
 qH c
q
+ HH + (1  ) [qHLH + (1  qH)LL]
From this and limited liability (LH  0) we see that the optimal incentive
contract is a stark RPE scheme:
Lemma 1 With common noise  > 0 there is a unique optimal static wage scheme
s = (0; HL; 0; 0), where HL =
c
(1 )q(1 qH) . The minimal wage cost is  = qH
c
q
.
Remark. As noted above, a contract will induce high e¤ort from both agents as
a unique equilibrium in the agentsgame if addition to IC it satises (H;L;) c 
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(L;L;). It can be shown that for any contract that satises IC with equality, this
condition will hold if the contract is RPE or IPE.
2.2 Relational contracting
Assume now that output is non-veriable. The incentive contract must then be self-
enforcing, and thus relationalby denition. We consider a multilateral punishment
structure where any deviation by the principal triggers low e¤ort from both agents.
The principal honors the contract only if both agents honored the contract in all
previous periods. The agents honor the contract only if the principal honored the
contract with both agents in all previous periods. A natural explanation for this
is that the agents interpret a unilateral contract breach (i.e. the principal deviates
from the contract with only one of the agents) as evidence that the principal is not
trustworthy (see Bewley, 1999, and Levin, 2002).9
The relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if the present value of honoring
is greater than the present value of reneging. Ex post realizations of values, the
principal can renege on the contract by refusing to pay the promised wage, while
the agents can renege by refusing to accept the promised wage, and instead hold-up
values and renegotiate what we may call a spot contract. The spot price is denoted
Qk. If values accrue directly to the principal, then  = 0. But if the agent is
able to hold-up values ex-post, then  is determined by bargaining power, outside
options and the ability to hold-up values. Assume that there exists an alternative
market for the agentsoutput, and that the agents are able to independently realize
values Qi,  2 (0; 1) ex post. If we assume Nash bargaining between principal and
agents, each agent will then receive Qk plus a share  from the surplus from trade
i.e. Qi + (Qk   Qk) = Qk where  =  + (1   ):The agentstotal hold-up
power, ; is then a positive function of bargaining power and outside options.
The parties are assumed to play trigger strategies. If the principal reneges on the
relational contract, both agents insist on spot contracting forever after. And vice
9Modelling multilateral punishments is also done for convenience. Bilateral punishments will
not alter our results qualitatively.
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versa: if one of the agents (or both) renege, the principal insists on spot contracting
forever after.
For a relational contract to dominate a spot contract, the agents cannot have
incentives to exert high e¤ort in a spot contract, that is
(1  )qQ < c (6)
Hence, if (2) and (6) hold, an incentive contract inducing both agents to exert
high e¤ort dominates a spot contract. Throughout the paper it will be assumed that
both these conditions hold, so that we have
 <
c
(1  )qQ  1:
2.2.1 Contract constraints
Consider now the conditions for the incentive contract to be self-enforcing, i.e. the
conditions for implementing a relational incentive contract. The parties decide
whether or not to honor the incentive contract ex post realization of output, but
ex ante bonus payments. The principal will honor the contract if
 kl   lk+
2
1   [QL + ( + (1  )qH)Q  ]
  (Qk +Ql) + 2
1   [QL + ( + (1  )qL)Q  S] , k; l 2 fH;Lg
where S = (QL+(+(1 )qL)Q) is the expected spot price. The LHS of the
inequality shows the principals expected present value from honoring the contract,
while the RHS shows the expected present value from reneging. We see that the
constraint binds when kl + lk   (Qk + Ql) is maximal. We can thus write the
condition as
10
max f2HH   2QH ; HL + LH   (QH +QL); 2LL   2QLg
 2
1   [(1  )qQ+ S   ] (EP)
Agent i will honor the contract if
kl+

1   (   c)  Qk +

1  S, k; l 2 fH;Lg
where similarly the LHS shows the agents expected present value from honoring
the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from reneging. The
constraint binds when kl   Qk is minimal. We can thus write the condition as
min fHH   QH ; HL   QH ; LH   QL; LL   QLg
 
1   [S    + c] (EA)
2.2.2 Optimal relational contract
To minimize expected wage costs, the principal will solve
min 
subject to (IC), (EP) and (EA)
Now, we showed that IC implies (5), and from this relation and EA (applied to
HH , LH and LL) we have
  

QH +

1   [S    + c]

+qH
c
q
+ (1  )

QL +

1   [S    + c]

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Collecting terms involving  and substituting for the spot price S = QH +
(1   )(QL + qLQ), this relation yields a lower bound for the wage cost. By an
argument similar to that in Kvaløy and Olsen (2006b) the following result can then
be established.
Lemma 2 In relational contracting we have:
(i) The wage cost  is bounded from below by min given by
min = qH
c
q
+maxf0; QL + Q  qL( c
q
  (1  )Q)g (8)
(ii) There exists 0 <
c
(1 )qQ and
~ < 1 such that for  > 0 the lower bound min
exceeds the cost for the veriable case (min > qH cq ), and can be attained if  >
~.
(iii) For  > 0 the cost min is decreasing in the common noise parameter .
From the previous section we know that IC and limited liability implies   qH cq .
The implementability conditions (EA) for the agents lead to the additional term in
the expression for min. This term is increasing in  and decreasing in , reecting
the fact that the EA conditions are more demanding when the agents have more
hold-up power (larger ) and less demanding for larger . The term is positive for all
  1 when  > 0 = qLQL+(+qL(1 ))Q cq , implying that min then strictly exceeds
the wage cost for the veriable case. In the following we will assume that the hold-up
problem is serious in the sense that this condition ( > 0) holds.
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The cost min is attained when IC binds and EA is binding for the bonuses
HH ; LH and LL. For the lower bound min to be attainable the associated bonuses
must also satisfy the implementability conditions EP for the principal. The latter
are more easily satised, the larger is . Statement (ii) in the lemma makes the point
that the relevant bonuses can be implemented, and hence the lower bound min can
be attained, when  exceeds some critical factor ~ < 1.11
10Note that  = 0 satises condition (6) with strict inequality when QL > 0, hence there is a
non-empty set of 0s satisfying  > 0 and (6).
11It can be veried that the critical factor ~ is given by 1 ~~ =
2[(1 )qQ c](1 qH)
(c (1 )0qQ) (1  )q.
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Note that, contrary to the veriable case, the minimal wage cost min increases
with more common noise (@min
@
= Q(1   qL) > 0). This is so because the
principal is prevented from using the stark RPE scheme. The intuition behind the
result is simple: With RPE, an agent is not paid well if his peer performs better.
This peer-dependence triggers breach of the relational contract since an agent who is
paid a low bonus after realizing a high output, has incentives to hold-up his output
and renegotiate payments. Hence, when contracts are incomplete and the agents
possess hold-up power, it is more costly to exploit common noise when designing
incentives.12
3 Endogenous hold-up power
If the principal/rm bears no cost of controlling the agentshold-up power, then the
rms wage costs are minimized if  is minimized, (subject to the constraints that
ensure high-e¤ort equilibria). But assume now that there are costs C() associated
with reducing the agentshold-up power, where C 0() < 0. Recall that we assumed
an alternative market for the agentsoutput, where they independently could realize
values Qk,  2 (0; 1) ex post. Assuming Nash bargaining between principal and
agents, each agent would then receive Qk plus a share  from the surplus from
trade i.e. Qk + (Qk   Qk) = Qk where  =  + (1   ): The rm can then
reduce  by reducing  and/or reducing .
The rms e¤ort to avoid ex post expropriation can in our model be seen as an
e¤ort to reduce . This can be achieved by investments in patent protection that
seek to protect intellectual property rights. It can also be achieved through non-
compete clauses in the employment contract; where a veriable non-compete clause
in principle can attain  = 0. The rm can also reduce  through allocation of asset
ownership. The fewer assets owned by the agents, the lower is . The parameter 
12The idea that outside opportunities a¤ect incentives is also promoted by Oyer (2004), who show
that rms may nd it protable to pay wages that are correlated with outside options. As opposed
to Oyer we look at variations in the ex post outside opportunitites, not the ex ante participation
constraint. Morover, Oyer does not consider the multiagent moral hazard problem.
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also depends on the specicity of the agentsvalue-added. The more rm specic
human capital the agentspossess - or the more narrow their respective skill sets are
- the lower is . But even if  = 0, the agents can still achieve a share  =  ex
post. This share  from the surplus from trade is determined by bargaining power,
and will typically increase with the indispensability of the agents: If agents possess
essential human capital that makes them indispensable for ex post value extraction,
then  is high. The rm can thus reduce  by making the agents ex post dispensable.
This can be achieved through job design, such as job rotation. The less specialized
the agents are, the lower is . But as noted, a high degree of specialization can
reduce outside options and thus reduce , so the overall e¤ect of specialization may
be ambiguous. Specialization may increase , but decrease .
The rm/principals objective is now to minimize ()+C(): Note that since  is
linear in , the problem has a corner solution if C 00()  0, implying that we will then
see only extremeorganizational solutions. Let  and  denote, respectively, the
minimal and the maximal feasible hold-up power for the agents. The rm will then
choose  =  if ()+C() < ()+C();and  =  if ()+C() > ()+C():This
implies that a small parameter change can give a signicant change in organizational
design.
Whether C() is concave or convex is di¢ cult to assess. But following the stan-
dard assumptions regarding cost functions, we may assume that the function is con-
vex for a given agent: The costs of ensuring some protection are relatively low, but
the marginal costs of avoiding any hold-up power are likely to be signicant. If
C 00() > 0 there is an interior solution satisfying13
0min() = QL + Q+ qL(1  )Q =  C 0() (9)
We now observe that the higher is 0min(), the lower  the rm will choose.
Observe that (for  > ~) we have
@
@
0min() = Q(1  qL) > 0
13We assume here that (9) has a solution in the range of admissible 0s.
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Hence, the more common noise, the higher are absolute wage costs (min), and
the higher are the marginal wage costs (0min()) associated with admitting hold-
up power to the agents. The more common noise, the lower is thus the optimal ;
the rm wishes to take a stronger control over the agentsassets if the agents are
exposed to more common noise. Note that there are two e¤ects that makes a higher
 more costly when common noise is introduced. The rst, least interesting e¤ect, is
through the higher expected spot price that the agents can achieve when our specic
specication of common noise is introduced. This higher spot price must be matched
through higher xed payments HL = LL.
The more interesting e¤ect is the cost of losing the ability to implement the opti-
mal degree of peer-dependence, namely, the starkest RPE scheme. In contrast, when
there is no common noise, there are no costs of not being able to implement peer-
dependent incentives. We can summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For   ~ we have: (i) The higher is the common noise factor, the
more the rm loses from its inability to implement the optimal degree of RPE in
the wage scheme. (ii) The higher is the common noise factor, the lower is the rms
optimal , and hence the higher is the rms optimal level of control over the relevant
assets.
We can also ask whether (and how) the agentse¤ort-productivity qQ=c af-
fects the rms choice of . We can write 0min() as QL + (QH   QL) + qL(1  
)(QH  QL). We then have:
@
@QL
0min() = (1  )  qL(1  ) > 0
@
@QH
0min() =  + qL(1  ) > 0
@
@qL
0min() = (1  )Q > 0
We see that the e¤ect of higher qQ on 0min() depends on parameter values,
since 0min() increases in both QL, QH , and qL, while it is not at all a¤ected by qH
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and c. But note that @
@QH
0min() increases in the noise factor , while
@
@QL
0min()
and @
@qL
0min() decrease in . Hence, with more common noise present, it is more
likely that a higher e¤ort productivity, qQ=c, increases 0min(), and thus reduces
the optimal . The intuition is as follows: The value of providing incentives increases
with e¤ort productivity, and as we know, common noise makes incentives based on
RPE optimal. Since a higher  reduces the feasibility of RPE, the optimal  decreases
with e¤ort productivity when common noise is signicant. Thus we may state the
following.
Proposition 2 For   ~ we have: Higher e¤ort productivity (higher qQ=c)
may, depending on the parameters reduce, increase or leave una¤ected the rms
optimal degree of asset control (). The higher is the common noise factor, the more
likely it is that higher e¤ort productivity reduces , and hence increases the rms
optimal level of asset control.
Finally, there is a comparative static result regarding the discount factor  that is
worth commenting. Observe that the marginal wage cost of higher  increases with
the discount factor:
@
@
0min() = qL(1  )Q > 0 (10)
The reason behind this is as follows. A higher  reduces the rms wage costscet.
par (see eq. (8)), since the agentsbenets from reneging on the relational contract
decrease with . However, the marginal wage reduction from higher  decreases with
, since the benet from reneging on the relational contract increases with :
We can interpret the discount factor as a measure of the dependency, or trust
level, between the transacting parties (see e.g. Hart, 2001, on interpreting  as trust;
and James Jr., 2002, for a nice survey on the economic concept of trust). We may
then take  = 0 to represent spot transactions, and  = 1 to represent fully dependent
high-trust relationships. Interestingly, we can then state
Proposition 3 For   ~ we have: The higher is the discount factor, the higher is
the marginal wage cost of increasing , and thus the lower is the rms optimal .
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The higher is , the higher is thus the rms optimal level of control over the relevant
assets.
It is natural to assume that the hold-up index  is higher in relationships between
rms than within rms. In parts of the literature, the boundaries of the rm are
implicitly dened by the hold-up power of the seller (see e.g. Grossman and Hart,
1986, and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002), i.e. the magnitude of  determines
whether parties are integrated or nonintegrated, where typically  = 0, or low, for
employees and  is high for independent suppliers. A novelty in our model is the
endogenous determination of a continuously varying  instead of a discrete , but
an increase in  can still be interpreted as a move from integrated transactions to
non-integrated transactions. An implication of the last proposition is then that spot
transactions are more likely to be non-integrated, while long-term relationships are
more likely to be organized within rms.
Before we conclude, it should be noted that we do not discuss Pareto optimal
hold-up power. In fact, this question is trivial here. The critical discount factor for
implementing rst best (high) e¤ort decreases with the agentshold-up power, simply
because it is the agents that take on investments (e¤ort). However, by constraining
our attention to the range of parameters where rst-best e¤ort is implemented, we
can ask how the rm optimally will determine the workershold-up power. In such,
our approach is related to Holmström andMilgrom who also take a rm perspective
by discussing how much asset ownership the rm should admit its agents to have.
In their model, the rm optimally trades o¤ the incentive costs (i.e. the lower-
powered agent incentives) of controlling assets against the benets of being able to
balance incentives between tasks. In our model, the rm trades o¤ the protection
costsof controlling assets - or more generally controlling the agentshold-up power,
against the benets of being able to exploit peer-dependence (relative performance
evaluation) in its incentive design.
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we argue that the rm will be more reluctant of giving hold-up power,
such as asset ownership, to workers if there exist conditions that call for peer-
dependent incentives.14 In particular, we show that if there exists common noise
that makes relative performance evaluation optimal , then the rm will increase its
e¤orts to reduce the workershold-up power.
The model has several empirical implications. One is that we will see less peer-
dependent incentives in markets or industries where it is di¢ cult or costly to limit the
workersoutside options. Hence, we will see less peer-dependence in industries with
well-developed job markets. For instance, the mid-career job market is relatively un-
derdeveloped in Japan compared to the US, and interestingly there is a lesser degree
of individual performance pay, and greater peer-dependence through job rotation,
teamwork and so-called J-type tournaments in Japan than in the US. (In J-type
tournaments aggregate bonus pools are xed such that the workerspay is a¤ected
by the marginal performance of their peers; see Kräkel, 2002, for an analysis of J-type
tournaments, and Endo (1994) and Itoh (1991) for discussions of incentive pay and
HRM-practice in Japanese rms.) Research indicating that individual performance
pay is more common in human capital intensive industries (Long and Shields, 2005,
Barth et al., 2006) also supports our models predictions.15 The analysis can also
explain why relative performance evaluation is used less in CEO compensation than
standard agency theory suggests.16 Even though our model has a multilateral fea-
14Although we concentrate on relative performance evaluation rather than team incentives in this
paper, the insight that hold-up limits the feasible degree of peer-dependent incentives also applies
to team incentives.
15Although team-based incentives are quite common in high-skilled businesses such as law rms
and software industries, several studies indicate a positive relationship between the intensity of
human capital and the prevalence of individual performance pay. In addition to the referred studies
by Long and Shields (2005) and Barth et al. (2006). Kato (2002) and Torrington (1993) indicate
that workers with more education are particularly interested in receiving rewards tailored to indi-
vidual performance, and Tremblay and Chenevert (2004) nd that high-tech rms (characterized
by a high percentage of scientists and engineers in the workforce) are more likely to use individual
performance pay.
16See Murphy (1999) who states that the paucity of RPE in options and other components of
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ture, our results are driven by the agentstemptations to renegotiate when not being
paid according to absolute output. A CEO interpretation is therefore not unreason-
able since they are in the position of holding-up values ex post if not being paid a
fair shareof their value added.
We also believe that the model contributes to the theory of the rm. A theory of
the rm should explain some dening characteristics of the rm, such as (i) The rm
owns critical assets (ii) The activities are correlated such that agents are exposed
to some common noise. (iii) Contracts are long-term, to a larger extent within
than between rms. (iv) Contracts are incomplete, to a larger extent within than
between rms. Our model predicts that within rm transactions (low ) are typical
when there is much common noise and when contracts are long-term (high ). It
also suggests why activities that keep  low are associated with rms rather than
markets, e.g. why the ownership of assets are clustered in rms, and why between-
rm transactions do not have the same sophistication as within rm transactions
where job rotation and strategic job design are important.
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